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TRANSLATING (AND INTERPRETING) THE MENGZI:

Reflections on Bryan Van Norden's Mengzi, with Selections from Traditional Commentaries
One has only to look at the back cover of Mengzi, with Selections from Traditional
Commentaries to see that I am a fan of this translation. In the interests of full disclosure, here is what I said:
Bryan W. Van Norden accomplishes two impressive feats in this important new translation of Mengzi (or Mencius). First, he presents the text in a traditional fashion, with indispensable commentary interwoven into -yet always clearly distinct from -the text. This opens up the text to modern readers as never before in a translation. Second, he both lets us hear the voice of the text's greatest commentator (Zhu Xi from the twelfth century) and gives us a translation faithful to the text's original time and philosophy. The supple balance with which Van Norden pulls this off makes this translation perfect for students, general readers, and scholars alike.
In the last two semesters, I have twice taught "Classical Chinese Philosophy" at Wesleyan, and both times used Van Norden's Mengzi as one of our texts. I have thus had considerable opportunity to discuss and reflect on the nature of its interpretation of Mengzi. This experience has suggested some questions but it has not changed by fundamental judgment: Van Norden has produced a splendid translation and interpretation of the Mengzi.
I. VIRTUE VERSUS OBLIGATION
In his commentary to 5A:2, Van Norden writes that the passage has illustrated: emphasis is on the character of the driver, rather than on the rules. To be sure, there may have been a code of charioteering involved, but whether its violation would count as deception depends on the circumstances and motives of the agents involved, as will be clear when we turn to the topic of "discretion," below. As mentioned above, it is possible that Mengzi could endorse a deontological distinction -for instance, it might be worse for Wang Liang to drive deceitfully himself, than for him to be in the chariot while Xi drove that way -but the concern that Mengzi expresses here seems to be readily encompassed in virtue language.
III. HOW TO EXERCISE DISCRETION
One of the most famous passages in Mengzi is 4A:17, in which Mengzi asserts that "discretion (quan 權)" directs us to save a drowning sister-in-law, notwithstanding the ritual prohibition against men and women touching in certain circumstances. A strength of Van
Norden's commentary is that it brings out the degree to which the role of discretion is an important theme throughout the Mengzi, rather than an idiosyncratic feature of 4A:17 (which is one of only two Mengzi passages to use the term quan in this sense). In 1B:15, Mengzi offers two different options to Duke Wen of Teng, whose small state was in peril: to flee or to defend to the death. Van Norden invokes Zhu Xi's discussion of the passage to show that the choice is a matter of "discretion": fleeing is only apt of one's character is so benevolent that the people will follow you, as the people of Bin once followed King Tai. Otherwise, one should follow similar issues are at stake in various other passages like 3B:1, 5A:2, and 6B: This passage illustrates very clearly the difference between Confucian "discretion" and either relativism or pluralism. The correct action is very context-sensitive, but there is one right response to a situation, so different sages would all do the same thing in the same situation.
xiii These are helpful and apt distinctions. Relativism would mean that the "Way" was relative to an era or a place, but Mengzi makes very clear that simply following the values of the current times is not a guarantee of genuine virtue (7B:37). Pluralism would mean that multiple ways might be equally correct; this, too, Mengzi rejects. However, it is worth making some further observations. First, Mengzi does seem to recognize different levels of attainment among exemplary individuals, as we saw above concerning Bo Yi, Yi Yin, and Kongzi. We can imagine that if they switched places, they might not all do the same things. Bo Yi and Yi Yin might be less worthy than Kongzi as a result, but Mengzi still wants to commend their character as far better than the average person. Second, it is possible to wonder whether one's distinct, individual character or personality might sometimes figure in to the "context" to which discretion should be sensitive.
The closest Mengzi gets to addressing this issue is in the 1B:15 discussion of whether to flee or fight. Zhu Xi claims that staying and fighting is the "standard," and fleeing alone represents "discretion." But might there not be a valuable kind of self-knowledge, and thus discretion, involved in knowing that one will fail if one flees and attempts to re-found the state elsewhere?
The contemporary philosopher Christine Swanton has argued, following Nietzsche, that we
should not try to be virtuous "beyond our strength," though she also adds that we should continuously try to strengthen or improve our virtue. 
